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Democratic Transition in Haiti:
An Unfinished Agenda
Marc L. Bazin
The 1988 Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. Memorial Lecture
In April 1983, Yale Law School's Allard K, Lowenstein International
Human Rights Project sponsored one of the last public addresses of the late
Benigno Aquino. In his memory, the Lowenstein Project-named for the
Congressman, U.S. representative to the United Nations, and Yale Law
School graduate, who was a vigorous advocate for human rights in the United
States and abroad-established an annual lecture to be given by a prominent
figure in the international human rights movement. Previous speakers have
included Kim Dae Jung of Korea and Amos Sawyer of Liberia.
Marc L. Bazin delivered these remarks as the Benigno S. Aquino Memo-
rial Lecture at the Yale Law School on April 27, 1988. Mr. Bazin, the
founder and current president of the Movement for the Installation of De-
mocracy in Haiti, is a leader of Haiti's democratic opposition. He has served
his country and the cause of human rights with distinction. Between 1968
and 1986 he held a number ofpositions with the World Bank in Washington,
D. C., Abidjan (Ivory Coast), and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso, formerly Up-
per Volta). During that time he served on a number of negotiating teams in
Europe and Africa. While at the World Bank he worked for the inclusion of
human rights criteria in World Bank lending policies. In Haiti, he was ap-
pointed Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs under Jean-Claude
("Baby Doc') Duvalier in an effort to respond to international pressure to
"modernize" the Haitian economy. He was dismissed by Duvaller five
months after taking office for attempting to tackle the epidemic corruption in
the government.
Following the February 1987 departure of Duvalier, Mr. Bazin emerged as
a principled advocate of democracy and a serious candidate for President.
These hopes were shattered on November 29, 1987, when Haiti's first free
elections in over thirty years were brutally interrupted by allies of the deposed
Duvalier dictatorship, who shot and hacked to death at least two dozen Hai-
tian voters and one foreign journalist. The disruption was used as an excuse
by the government to abolish the independent election council that had been
formed to oversee the transition to democracy, and to establish a council that
better reflected the interests of the military. New elections were called for
January 17, 1988. Mr. Bazin and three other prominent opposition leaders,
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who together were expected to share eighty percent of the presidential vote,
led a boycott of these elections to protest the government's manipulation of
the electoral process.
It is for me a great pleasure to be invited to deliver the 1988 Benigno S.
Aquino Memorial Lecture within the framework of the Lowenstein In-
ternational Human Rights Project at Yale Law School. Allard K. Low-
enstein passionately believed that one person can make a difference in the
world. So did Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., a man of deep compassion and
humanity whose life was an example for all true democrats, and whose
tragic death is a lasting legacy to the cause of freedom, justice, and equal-
ity. I therefore consider it a privilege to be associated with Benigno S.
Aquino and with other prominent figures in the international hilman
rights movement. But, most importantly, I regard your invitation as a
tribute to the struggle of the Haitian people and of the emerging coalition
of human rights advocates, youth, labor, women, and political organiza-
tions, who have demonstrated, particularly over the last two years, their
peaceful determination to end a political system that represses liberties
and frustrates the quest for economic justice.
Benigno Aquino once said, "I would never be able to forgive myself if
I had to live with the knowledge that I could have done something and I
did not do anything." This, my friends, is exactly the sentiment of an
increasing number of Haitians today, whether intellectuals, technocrats,
industrialists, church leaders, political activists, or Haitians living
abroad. In my own case, the fear that I might one day look back and
realize that I could have made a difference but did not try hard enough
has been an inspiring force.
In discussing Haiti's unfinished struggle for democracy tonight, I will
make essentially three points. First, Haiti needs democracy. Second,
Haltians want and deserve democracy. They have been fighting hard for
it, but their efforts suffered a serious setback on November 29, 1987.
Third, Haiti is now at a crossroads. Haitians and their neighbors, espe-
cially the United States, must have faith, and act on that faith, in seeking
to return to the democratic path that appeared so open and bright less
than a year ago.
I. Haiti Needs Democracy
To most of you, who have always held as self-evident that all men are
created equal and who have been raised in the sacred commitment that
government of the people, by the people, and for the people shall not
perish, the question of whether a country needs democracy may sound
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odd. In fact, however, this question is highly relevant to Haiti today. As
you know, over the last twenty-five years the idea that men are by nature
equally free and independent, and have certain natural and inherent
rights, has not always been equally shared by those in economic decision-
making circles, particularly a number of development planners and finan-
cial aid-oriented institutions of the Western democracies.
For too long, we have heard-or, more accurately, it has been deli-
cately suggested-that representative democracy, which takes the will of
the people as the basis of authority of government, is a luxury that only
advanced, rich, industrialized countries can afford. One by-product of
this assumption is the rather extravagant distinction between so-called
"economic" and political refugees. Another is the belief that calls for
democracy in poor, illiterate countries cannot come from any quarter
other than the Western-oriented elites. Calls for democracy, it is pre-
sumed, do not reflect the true aspirations of the masses, who are thought
to be more concerned with food and health care than with political lib-
erty. Every democrat and every person of true compassion should have
serious reservations about such a theory. Every human being should be
entitled, under all circumstances, to exercise all the rights and opportuni-
ties that will enable him or her to reach their full potential.
Yet, I do appreciate the fact that basic needs can be met and have been
met by a wide variety of political regimes. The governments of Japan,
Israel, Costa Rica, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Yugoslavia, and Sri
Lanka are neither equally open and respectful of human rights, nor car-
bon copies of Western democracies, yet they do provide a level of basic
human needs to their clients. In the case of Haiti, however, there is no
point wasting time looking for what system or combination of systems,
or what degree of protection of human rights, will most adequately meet
the minimum standards required for the basic needs of all. What Haiti
needs, in any case, is democracy-total democracy, and nothing but de-
mocracy. Why?
There is probably no other country in the developing world in which
the absence of democratic rule has led to such a systematic pattern of
brutal violation of human rights. To invert a famous quotation, Haiti for
too long has been a nation of men, not laws. On any given day, under the
traditional system, the law in Haiti is what the rulers say it is. Arbitrari-
ness is the rule. Social, economic, and political oppression are deeply
rooted in the system and they are closely interrelated.
Let's have a look at the facts. Haiti is a small, densely populated and
predominately rural country. Our 5.4 million people occupy 28,000
square kilometers on the western end of the island of Hispaniola, forty
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miles from Cuba. Haiti is the poorest among the poor. Of the eleven
socio-economic indicators of absolute poverty as defined by the United
Nations, Haiti ranks worst in nine. Our annual income per capita is
$300. The next poorest country in Latin America is Bolivia. Yet Bo-
livia's income per capita is twice that of Haiti.
The health picture is distressing. Eighty percent of children under six
have malaria, and large numbers suffer from diarrhea and tuberculosis.
Few Haitians have access to doctors, a fact perhaps best reflected in a life
expectancy of fifty-two years, compared to seventy and seventy-two in
Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, respectively.
Approximately eighty percent of the adult population is unemployed
or under-employed. The illiteracy rate is the highest in the hemisphere:
eighty-three percent nationally, and reaching as high as ninety percent in
the rural areas. Finally, according to the World Bank, less than one per-
cent of the population receives more than fifty percent of national in-
come. This partly explains the massive migration of boat people and
braceros to Miami and the Dominican Republic under the most abomi-
nable conditions.
Given these facts, even under the best possible scenario of government
leadership and democratic institutions, opportunity for development and
growth will have to be carefully managed, and expectations for optimum
living conditions kept at a reasonable level for all. The point I would like
to emphasize, however, is that when confronted with the most human
and pressing problems of hunger, disease, and illiteracy, the traditional
Haitian political system has offered little but active neglect. Even worse,
the system has exacerbated Haiti's problems through land seizure, arbi-
trary arrests, political killings, forced exile, and massive corruption that
has siphoned off meager public funds and much foreign assistance for
personal gain.
From this one can draw at least three conclusions. First, there is a
striking relationship between systematic and continuing violation of
human rights and the disastrous economic conditions. Second, the con-
centration of power and wealth in the hands of a few in Port-au-Prince,
the capital city, contributes strongly to the underdevelopment of the ru-
ral areas where the vast majority lives. Finally, what little redistribution
has taken place over the years has mainly benefited a tiny fraction of the
urban middle class, leaving poverty untouched and widening the gap be-
tween the haves and the have-nots.
All this seems to me to make a reasonably strong case for democracy
in Haiti. This case is strengthened when one considers the need to tap
private entrepreneurship, self-help, and community participation, with-
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out which no development effort is likely to succeed. These are all in-
compatible with the absence of the rule of law and democracy. I
therefore see no escape from the conclusion that, in light of the way our
system has traditionally worked, democracy is not only a desirable vir-
tue, but a necessity. I strongly believe that democracy for the sake of
democracy has become part of the basic needs package in Haiti. Democ-
racy is the minimum that must be achieved before the poorest segments
of the population can get sufficiently organized to compete, with a fair
chance, for all other basic needs, such as food, health, education, and
jobs.
II. Haitians Want and Deserve the Democracy They Have Fought
For
No events better illustrate the painful struggle of the Haitian people to
peacefully build a new society based on individual freedom than those
that took place between February 7, 1986, and Black Sunday (November
29, 1987). Most importantly, during this period Haitians drafted and
approved a new constitution, and prepared and campaigned for munici-
pal, legislative, and presidential elections.
A. Drafting and Approving the Constitution
Upon the departure of Jean Claude Duvalier on February 7, 1986,
power to govern Haiti was transferred to a six-member Council of Na-
tional Government (the "Governing Council"), which was granted au-
thority to act as a transitional government by the departing president. In
June the Governing Council announced an electoral timetable which set
forth dates for Constituent Assembly, municipal, legislative, and presi-
dential elections, and for a referendum to adopt a new constitution.
Elections for forty-one of the sixty-one Constituent Assembly seats were
held on October 19, 1986. The remaining members were chosen by the
Governing Council.
Two preliminary draft constitutions were prepared, one by a Gov-
erning Council team and the other by the Ministry of the Interior. These
drafts were submitted to the Constituent Assembly, which had begun to
meet in December 1986. Contrary to the fears of many, the Assembly
chose not to rubber-stamp either of the drafts. Instead, it embarked on
the arduous task of preparing a totally new constitution for Haiti, one
that bore little resemblance to either draft or to previous Haitian consti-
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1) The reduction of the president's constitutional powers through an
increase in the powers of the legislature and provision for a prime minis-
ter with significant administrative power responsible to the two houses of
the legislature;
2) The decentralization of authority through the establishment of
elected departmental and local councils;
3) The separation of the army and the police, with the latter placed
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice;
4) The subordination of the military to civilian courts in all cases in-
volving civilians;
5) The establishment of a Permanent Election Council and a Provi-
sional Electoral Council (the "Electoral Council") to administer the elec-
tions scheduled for 1987; and
6) A provision barring certain individuals associated with the previous
regime from holding public office for ten years. Articles covering the
protection of individual rights, civil service, the economy, the agricul-
tural system, the environment, and the family further signaled a clean
break with the past.
On March 29, 1987, Haitians overwhelmingly ratified the new consti-
tution, marking the end, it was hoped, of the Duvalier era's worst ex-
cesses. By mid-May, the Electoral Council had been established,
composed of nine members, each appointed by a different sector of Hai-
tian society. More than seventy political parties emerged during the
twenty-one months following Duvalier's departure. The parties' major
activity during the period prior to the campaign was to designate candi-
dates. Some of the better organized parties were able to designate candi-
dates for many of the 105 positions-the presidency plus twenty-seven
senate and seventy-seven congressional seats-being contested on No-
vember 29th. In addition, several well-known individuals preferred to
run as independents.
B. The Preparation and Campaign for Municipal, Legislative, and
Presidential Elections
From the beginning tension developed between the Governing Council
and the Electoral Council. In June 1987 the Governing Council at-
tempted to usurp the Electoral Council's constitutional function by refus-
ing to promulgate the duly drafted election law and instead promulgating
its own version, which greatly reduced the Electoral Council's authority.
In the face of protests from most sectors of society, the Governing Coun-
cil finally revoked its election law in August and accepted the Electoral
Council's draft substantially unchanged.
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In the months that followed, however, military forces and paramilitary
death squads retaliated with a widespread terror campaign against the
population. In the northwest region of the country, 320 members of a
cooperative religious group were killed in a land dispute. In August, four
prominent Catholic priests and their driver were badly beaten by a
paramilitary group about 100 meters from an Army checkpoint. In the
same month, two presidential candidates were killed, one of them-Yves
Volel-at 10:00 A.M. in front of police headquarters and in full view of
several Haitian and foreign journalists. The Electoral Council's head-
quarters were burned, and the transmitter of the Catholic Church's Ra-
dio Soleil was destroyed. The homes and offices of leading presidential
candidates, including mine, were sprayed with bullets, forcing candidates
to campaign in a climate of violence and insecurity. The Governing
Council did everything in its power to frustrate the operations of the
Electoral Council. It held up international financial assistance that had
been donated to the Electoral Council, refused to provide logistical
assistance or protection to Electoral Council members or offices, and de-
nied flight clearance to helicopters attempting to distribute ballots.
On election day, fourteen people were massacred at one polling sta-
tion. One foreign journalist was killed. Faced with this blind violence,
the Electoral Council called off the elections. So it was that on Black
Sunday-November 29, 1987-Haitians, diplomats, the domestic and
foreign media, and international observers all witnessed the ugliness of
Macoute terror: acts of cruelty perpetrated against a peaceful people ea-
ger for democracy and better living conditions, acts that took place in
broad daylight, without fear of police or military intervention, and pre-
sumably with the active support of the police and army. Sadly, and yet
heroically, in the face of all this, people kept forming lines and holding
their ballot papers as they fell under the assassins' bullets and the
machet6s of the death squads.
On the same day that the elections ended in a stream of innocent
blood, the Governing Council dissolved the Electoral Council and ap-
pointed a new body through which it would have full control over the
electoral process. On January 17, 1988, through fraudulent elections
wholly without credibility-the U.S. State Department has stated that
the elections were neither free nor honest-and with ninety-five percent
of Haitians abstaining, the Governing Council selected Leslie Manigat as
President of Haiti. All four front runners, including me, chose not to
participate in the farcical elections.
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III. Haiti at a Crossroads: What is to be Done?
Mr. Manigat has now been in office for more than three months, and
the large majority of Haitians continue to regard his government as de
facto and not representative of the will of the people. While the man in
the street so far seems to have a perplexed and critical "wait and see"
attitude, the dominant view among most sectors of the organized polit-
ical structure is that the government enjoys no legitimacy, and that there
is a need to return to constitutional legitimacy, the first step of which can
only be the appointment of a truly independent Electoral Council and the
organization of new national elections.
Haiti faces many impediments to a resumption of progress toward de-
mocracy. In addition to the considerable uncertainty as to how support-
ive the Haitian military may be to a transition to democracy, many other
factors are likely, under present circumstances, to make the task of turn-
ing yesterday's promises into tomorrow's reality enormously difficult.
Most obvious is the condition of our fragile economy, marked by a con-
sistently declining volume and value of agricultural production and ex-
ports, an increasing dependence on imported foods, the shifting of output
and employment toward urban centers, a weak external position, and
virtually zero growth in per capita income over the last five years. In a
climate of political uncertainty, very low investment initiative, uncon-
trolled smuggling, negligible savings, and rising inflation, how and when
reasonable economic gains can be achieved to offset the pressures of
rapid population growth remains to be assessed.
Other challenges to democracy include the weakness and inadequacy
of current institutional structures, particulary the judiciary and the bu-
reaucratic apparatus, the intransigence of the center-right candidates,
who deeply resent having been bypassed by the military in favor of Mr.
Manigat in the recent rigged elections, and the unpredictability of Haiti's
Parliament. Other forces that could exert decisive influence in the re-
structuring of the political, social, and economic order include the
churches, the voluntary associations, the workers' unions, the student or-
ganizations, the overseas Haitian communities, and the democratic polit-
ical organizations of the center. The real issue at this point is whether
action by one of these forces, or by any combination of them, in the face
of the deteriorating economic situation, insufficient popular support, and
a general lack of confidence in the workability of the January 17 political
solution, will soon result in an instability of major proportion. This is
not altogether clear at the moment. We do know, however, that no single
leader, nor any one party, especially when drafted against the will of the
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people, will ever be able to pull the country together so that we may put
Duvalier behind us and look to the future.
To reach a lasting and satisfactory solution to the post-Duvalier crisis,
Haiti needs a strategy framed with ingenuity, generosity, and
determination. The single ingredient most vital to such a strategy is
faith: faith in Haiti's destiny, faith in the Haitians' capacity to overcome
insurmountable obstacles for the good of the country, faith in the demo-
cratic process itself.
To avoid further polarization, prevent further violence, and stop the
erosion of national unity, Haitians have got to talk to each other. What
is needed is a global, concerted plan aimed at national reconciliation
through the promotion of democracy. The key feature of such a plan
would be a National Conference of Haitian political, military, and
human rights leaders. Such a Conference would be held under the aus-
pices of our churches along with observers from traditionally friendly
countries. The agenda for such a Conference would take into account
the worries of some, the resentment of many, and the aspirations of the
majority. Such a Conference would require the recognition by all that
for Haiti to become a country endowed with political institutions, a sense
of shared community, and respect for law, a negotiated solution is an
imperative. Perhaps it is the only way.
This is primarily and exclusively a Haitian agenda. But friends can
always help, particularly when they come as neighbors and in a construc-
tive spirit. There is a role here for the United States, most importantly in
refusing to accept the false results of the rigged January 17 elections and
in continuing to encourage the Haitian people in their quest for
democracy.
I believe there is no nation in Central or Latin America that more
challenges the American values of democracy, economic justice, equal
opportunity, and freedom, than Haiti. Haiti was brutally occupied by
the United States for more than fifteen years, and the United States did
little to help us lay the groundwork needed for democracy to take root.
The challenge now is to show that the two countries can surmount this
legacy and learn to live in freedom and harmony, based on mutual re-
spect and recognition of each other's interests. This moral imperative is
reinforced by practical considerations. Haiti is located on the eastern
shore of the Windward Passage. The second most important Haitian city
is New York. It would seem that the United States cannot achieve its
worldwide foreign policy goals of encouraging democracy and private
enterprise against state authoritarianism if it does not strive for them in a
country that is so close a neighbor. United States support for democracy
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in Haiti should not be regarded as an act of generosity but as a reflection
of the United States' own national interest.
After 200 years of political independence with little economic progress
and almost constant systematic violation of our most fundamental rights,
we Haitians have learned that big victories do not come without pain,
sacrifice, and loss of life. The worst may not yet be over. Yet our peace-
ful fight for change shall continue. For we want a better future for our
country. We want freedom for our people. We want hope for our chil-
dren. We want pride for our countrymen abroad. We want democracy
to succeed. Within our territory, we want to live in peace and harmony
with each other. We want friendship with the United States, the neigh-
bor that is always expected to stand for progress, freedom, and equality.
You of this great law school, and you whose day-to-day involvement
in the Lowenstein International Human Rights Project shows your faith-
fulness to the messages of Allard Lowenstein and Benigno Aquino, I'm
not kidding you: you sure can help.
Thank you all and God bless you.
